Takings - The Federal Circuit Denies Compensation for Passenger Screening Companies Pushed out of the Airport by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act: \u3cem\u3eHuntleigh USA Corp. v. United States\u3c/em\u3e by McBride, Paul
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 74 | Issue 1 Article 6
2009
Takings - The Federal Circuit Denies
Compensation for Passenger Screening Companies
Pushed out of the Airport by the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act: Huntleigh USA Corp. v.
United States
Paul McBride
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul McBride, Takings - The Federal Circuit Denies Compensation for Passenger Screening Companies Pushed out of the Airport by the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act: Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 74 J. Air L. & Com. 121 (2009)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol74/iss1/6
TAKINGS-THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT DENIES
COMPENSATION FOR PASSENGER SCREENING
COMPANIES PUSHED OUT OF THE AIRPORT BY THE
AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT:
HUNTLEIGH USA CORP. V. UNITED STATES
PAUL McBRJDE*
F OLLOWING THE terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
Congress concluded that "fundamental change [s] " were nec-
essary to rectify the ineffectiveness of existing airport security
procedures.' These fundamental changes, enacted less than
three months after the attacks, came in the form of the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act (ATSA).2 Nestled among
ATSA's numerous requirements was a provision that com-
manded the federalization of passenger and baggage screening
responsibilities at the nation's airports.' By refusing to acknowl-
edge that federalizing screening responsibilities obligated the
federal government to pay just compensation to Huntleigh USA
Corporation (Huntleigh), a private screening company, the Fed-
eral Circuit endorsed a taking of private property that violated
Huntleigh's right to just compensation under the Fifth Amend-
ment's Takings Clause.4
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
M.S. 2005, University of Maryland University College; B.S. 2001, United States
Military Academy at West Point. The author would like to thank his wife,
Shawnie, and his children, Matthew, Aoife, and Lorelei, for their love and
support.
I H.R. RrP. No. 107-296, at 53 (2001) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 590.
2 See generally Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115
Stat. 597 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (Supp.
2001)).
3 Id. § 101(g)(1), 115 Stat. at 603 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44901
(Supp. 2001)).
4 Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States (Huntleigh I), 525 F.3d 1370, 1373-74
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
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In 1974, Congress enacted legislation that required airlines to
begin screening passengers and baggage in the civil aviation sys-
tem.5 To meet their obligations, many airlines contracted with
private security companies that, for a fee, performed the re-
quired screening.6 In November 2001, Huntleigh, who began
screening operations in 1989, had passenger and baggage
screening contracts with approximately seventy-five airlines at
thirty-five domestic airports.7 While some of Huntleigh's con-
tracts were for fixed periods and others continued indefinitely,
all were terminable upon notice by either party.' In the decade
prior to ATSA, however, no major airline terminated a contract
with Huntleigh.9
Under ATSA, Congress directed a new federal agency, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), to assume re-
sponsibility for airport security by February 19, 2002, and com-
plete the federalization of passenger and baggage screening by
November 19, 2002.0 To provide security during the interim
period, rather than assuming the existing contracts or accepting
assignments of the contracts as required by ATSA,"1 the TSA en-
tered into new short-term contracts with screening companies,
including Huntleigh. 12 Although only one airline actually ac-
knowledged the termination of its contracts with Huntleigh, in
view of ATSA's requirements, the airlines and Huntleigh al-
lowed the contracts to expire according to their terms.1" As the
federalization deadline approached, the TSA substituted federal
screeners in place of the contracted screeners.1 4 As a result,
within one year after the enactment of ATSA the new govern-
ment monopoly completely replaced the market for private
screening. "
5 Air Transportation Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, § 315(a), 88 Stat.
409, 415 (repealed 1994).




10 See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71,
§§ 101(g)(1), 110(c)(1), 115 Stat. 597, 603, 616 (2001).
1" Id. §§ 101(g)(1)-(2), 115 Stat. at 603-04.
12 Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States (Huntleigh II1), 75 Fed. Cl. 642, 644
(Fed. Cl. 2007).
13 Huntleigh IV, 525 F.3d at 1376.
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In November 2003, Huntleigh brought suit against the United
States in the Court of Federal Claims asserting that as a result of
ATSA, the government effected a taking of Huntleigh's con-
tracts, going concern value, and goodwill without providing just
compensation.' 6 Additionally, Huntleigh asserted that the gov-
ernment violated the provisions of ATSA by not providing ade-
quate compensation when the TSA assumed the rights and
responsibilities of Huntleigh's contracts. 7 At three points prior
to trial, the government attempted to secure the dismissal of
Huntleigh's claims. 8 In January 2005, the Court of Federal
Claims denied the government's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. 9 In its opinion, the court
found that Huntleigh's contracts, goodwill, and going concern
value were compensable property under the Fifth Amendment
and that Huntleigh was entitled to present evidence to show that
the property was taken. z In April 2005, the court rejected the
government's motion for reconsideration finding that the gov-
ernment presented no new facts or arguments that would alter
its opinion. 21 Finally, at the close of fact and expert discovery,
the court, ruling from the bench, relied on the findings con-
tained in its previous orders and denied the government's mo-
tion for summary judgment.22
Following a four-day bench trial, however, the court ruled in
favor of the United States and ordered the dismissal of Hun-
tleigh's claims. 23 This decision was a significant departure from
the reasoning and conclusions contained in the court's previous
orders.24 In its opinion, the court attributed the differences to
"the benefit of a complete record and a review of the applicable
law."' 25 Appealing the trial court's decision to the Federal Cir-
cuit, Huntleigh asserted that the trial court erred in finding that
(1) the enactment of ATSA did not result in a taking of Hun-
tleigh's property; and (2) that under the provisions of the Act,
16 HuntLeigh III, 75 Fed. Cl. at 643.
'7 Id.
18 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 14, at 4-9.
19 Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States (Huntleigh 1), 63 Fed. CI. 440, 442
(Fed. Cl. 2005).
20 Id. at 444-50.
21 Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States (Huntleigh I1), 65 Fed. Cl. 178, 178-79
(Fed. Cl. 2005).
22 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 14, at 9-10.
23 Huntleigh TV, 525 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
24 See Huntleigh III, 75 Fed. Cl. 642, 644 (Fed. Cl. 2007).
25 Id.
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Huntleigh was not entitled to adequate compensation for the
assumption of its contracts. 26 Although its analysis of Hun-
tleigh's takings claim differed from that of the trial court,27 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision.2
In addressing Huntleigh's Takings Clause claim, the Federal
Circuit began by recognizing that the property interests asserted
by Huntleigh were cognizable under the Fifth Amendment. 29
The court then explained that because the government did not
actually assume Huntleigh's contracts, any taking must be be-
cause "ATSA rendered the contracts and the going concern
value and goodwill associated with Huntleigh's security screen-
ing business worthless."3 ° Relying on its interpretation of estab-
lished precedent, the Federal Circuit concluded that because
ATSA was directed at the airlines and not at the screening com-
panies, Huntleigh's losses were indirect, stemming only from a
frustration of Huntleigh's business expectations, and therefore
not a taking."
In reaching its holding, the Federal Circuit focused primarily
on two cases: Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States 2 and Air Pega-
sus of D. C. v. United States.3 In Omnia, the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the government's conduct of requisitioning the
steel plate produced by Allegheny Steel Company was a taking
of Omnia's executory contract to purchase the steel at below
market price:3 The Supreme Court acknowledged that if the
government took the contract, there would be an obligation to
provide compensation; however, it cautioned against confusing
the subject matter of the contract with the contract itself.35 The
26 Huntleigh IV, 525 F.3d at 1377.
27 Compare id. at 1378-79 (finding that Huntleigh did possess a cognizable
property interest but that the interest was not taken) with Huntleigh III, 75 Fed. Cl.
at 646-47 (finding that Huntleigh did not have a cognizable property interest).
28 Huntleigh IV, 525 F.3d at 1373-74. On August 13, 2008, Huntleigh filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court seeking review only of the
Federal Circuit's decision dismissing the takings claim. Petition for a Writ of Cer-
tiorari at 13, Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, No. 08-198 (S. Ct. Aug. 13,
2008). On December 1, 2008, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Huntleigh
USA Corp. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 626 (2008).
29 Huntleigh TV, 525 F.3d at 1378.
30 Id. at 1379.
31 Id. at 1380.
32 Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 510 (1923).
33 Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1216 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
4 Omnia, 261 U.S. at 507-08.
3 Id. at 510-11.
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Supreme Court stated that "[i] n exercising the power to requisi-
tion, the government dealt only with the steel company.... As a
result of this lawful governmental action the performance of the
contract was rendered impossible. It was not appropriated, but
ended."36 Omnia therefore stands for the proposition that a
company's consequential loss resulting from legislation that
only indirectly impacts its contract rights is not compensable as
a taking. 7 Consistent with Omnia, in Air Pegasus the Federal Cir-
cuit concluded that any frustration of Air Pegasus's business ex-
pectations was indirect and not compensable.3 8 It explained
that because Air Pegasus neither operated nor owned any heli-
copters, restricting the airspace above Air Pegasus's heliport
leasehold was a regulation of third parties that only indirectly
affected Air Pegasus. 9
Relying on Omni and Air Pegasus, the Federal Circuit deter-
mined that because ATSA was directed at the airline companies,
any impact on Huntleigh was only incidental.4" Stating that
Huntleigh's claim was indistinguishable from the facts of Air Peg-
asus, the Federal Circuit concluded that Huntleigh's losses were
"indirect, arising only as a consequence of ATSA's elimination
of the airlines' security screening obligations" and therefore not
compensable as a taking.4 The court expressly rejected Hun-
tleigh's contention that, unlike in Omnia and Air Pegasus, Con-
gress specifically directed ATSA at airport security screening
companies and that its damages were direct, rather than the
product of the regulation of third parties.42
While the court asserted that Omnia and Air Pegasus supported
its holding, a closer examination of Huntleigh's situation yields
an opposite conclusion. The holdings of both Omnia and Air
Pegasus were grounded in the fact that the regulation at issue
was directed at a party other than the claimant, and therefore,
the claimant's loss was only consequential.4 In Omnia, the gov-
ernment was concerned with obtaining steel plate necessary to
support the ongoing war effort-it was only incidental that the
36 Id. at 511.
37 Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1335 (Fed. Cir, 2003).
38 Air Pegasus, 424 F.3d at 1216.
39 Id. at 1215.
40 Huntleigh IV, 525 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
41 Id. at 1380.
42 Id. at 1380-81.
43 Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1923) (di-
rected at Allegheny Steel); Air Pegasus, 424 F.3d at 1215 (directed at aviators).
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requisition required the termination of Omnia's executory con-
tract.44 Likewise, in Air Pegasus, the government regulation ad-
dressed the terrorist threat associated with the operation of
aircraft over Washington D.C.-it was only incidental that this
regulation affected Air Pegasus's ability to operate a heliport.4 5
The Federal Circuit's assertion that ATSA was directed at the
airlines, and that Huntleigh was only impacted indirectly as a
third party, was the fundamental flaw in its analysis of Hun-
tleigh's claim. By describing Congress's action as merely an
"elimination of the airlines' security screening obligations[,]"46
the court vastly oversimplified the purpose of ATSA. "Elimina-
tion" implies only that the obligation previously imposed by the
government no longer exists. If this were the situation, a
stronger argument could be made that Huntleigh's losses were
incidental and its takings claim was unsupported.
In actuality though, ATSA did not simply eliminate the obliga-
tion; rather, it transferred responsibility for the obligation to the
federal government.47 The express purpose of the transfer, as
reflected in Congress's findings, was to bring airport security
functions under the federal government's control in order to
correct the failings it attributed to the private security firms.4 8
To that end, it is undeniable that Congress intended for ATSA
to directly impact the private screening firms, like Huntleigh, by
eliminating their role in passenger and baggage screening. In
fact, significant portions of the floor debate on the Act were di-
rected at removing contracted security firms from the nation's
airports. As one Representative stated, "[t]he bill we passed in
the House last week does not call for Federal law enforcement
personnel to be entrusted with aviation security. Only the Sen-
ate version does. The House bill simply calls for the oversight of
private firms that have already proven themselves incapable of
doing the job."4 9
44 See Omnia, 261 U.S. at 510-511.
45 See Air Pegasus, 424 F.3d at 1209-10.
46 Huntleigh IV, 525 F.3d at 1380.
47 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(g)(1),
115 Stat. 597, 616 (2001).
48 H.R. REP. No. 107-296, at 53 (2001) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 590.
49 147 CONG. REc. H7754 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 2001) (statement of Rep. Crowley);
see also id. (statement of Rep. Moran) (stating that the House of Representative's
refusal to eliminate private screening firms was a victory for the private screening
industry and that federal screeners are necessary to restore the public
confidence).
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While helpful, resort to the legislative history is not necessary
to reach the conclusion that Omnia is not applicable to Hun-
tleigh's takings claim. This fact is apparent from the text of
ATSA itself. In Cienega Gardens v. United States, the Federal Cir-
cuit considered legislation that effectively prevented owners of
housing projects operated under Department of Housing and
Urban Development programs from exercising their contract
right to prepay their private mortgages after twenty years.5"
Finding that the legislation effected a taking, the court stated
that, "[t]he proposition in Omnia about consequential loss or
injury refers to legislation targeted at some public benefit, which
incidentally affects contract rights, not, as in this case, legislation
aimed at the contract rights themselves in order to nullify
them."51 Immediately following ATSA's mandate that the gov-
ernment assume the responsibility for aviation security, Con-
gress included two separate provisions that specified how the
government was to address contracts between the private screen-
ing companies and the airlines.52 Congress's inclusion of these
provisions evidenced its intent either to nullify the contract
rights of the private screening companies or to perpetuate the
contracts with the government in place of the airlines until the
completion of federalization. Therefore, under Cienega Gardens,
because ATSA was aimed directly at Hundeigh's contract rights,
Omnia does not apply.53
Furthermore, the court's argument that Huntleigh's claim
was indistinguishable from the facts of Air Pegasus is incorrect.
Drawing an analogy to Omnia, the court in Air Pegasus stated that
the claimant did have a property interest in its leasehold, but
that it did not allege that the restrictions regulated its opera-
tions under the lease. 54 The court's decision in Air Pegasus
therefore was not that the company's property was not taken;
rather, the court found the property interest asserted by Air Peg-
asus, the right to operate a heliport which "assumed the ability
for the helicopters to use [the] airspace[,]" was not cognizable
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.55 Considering that Air
50 Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1325-27 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
51 Id. at 1335.
52 Aviation and Transportation Security Act §§ 101(g)(1), 110(c)(1), 115 Stat.
at 603, 616.
53 See Cienega Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1335.
54 Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1216 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
55 Id. at 1214.
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Pegasus neither owned nor operated any helicopters, the court
noted that the "economic injury is not the result of the govern-
ment taking Air Pegasus's property, but is the more attenuated
result of the government's purported taking of other people's
property. ''56 In fact, counsel for Air Pegasus admitted at oral ar-
gument that its takings claim was really for a "derivative in-
jury. '57 Unlike in Air Pegasus, however, the Federal Circuit
readily acknowledged that Huntleigh asserted a cognizable
property interest and that it claimed that ATSA directly affected
the property interest.58 The court therefore devoted the major-
ity of its opinion only to determining whether that property in-
terest was taken. Because the court never reached this second
stage of the inquiry in Air Pegasus, any analogy between the two
cases used to support the holding is misplaced.59
In 1922,Justice Holmes stated that "[w]e are in danger of for-
getting that a strong public desire to improve the public condi-
tion is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."60
Only one year later, however, the Supreme Court in Omnia con-
tributed to this danger by drawing an artificial distinction be-
tween the contract and the subject matter of the contract.61
Eighty years after the Supreme Court created the distinction,
the Federal Circuit's holding in Cienega Gardens clarified Omnia
by acknowledging that compensation is due when "legislation is
aimed at the contract rights themselves. 6 2
The Federal Circuit's holding in Huntleigh IV, however, cre-
ated two significant and coordinated threats to the protection of
private contract rights from government taking. First, by refus-
ing to acknowledge that ATSA was "aimed at" and directly af-
fected Huntleigh's contract rights, the Federal Circuit
undermined the limitation on Omni expressed in Cienega Gar-
dens.6" Second, by misstating the essential facts of Cienega Gar-
56 Id. at 1215.
57 Id.
58 Huntleigh TV, 525 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
59 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at 19 n.1.
60 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
61 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRRIATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 91-92 (1985) ("The government takes private property when it compels
an assignment of a contract right from the buyer for less than its fair market
value. Surely, then, it 'takes' the contract when it chooses not to compel that
assignment but to appropriate the contract's subject matter.").
62 Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
63 See id.
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dens, the court drew an erroneous distinction between
conceptually identical cases and thereby created an internal
split in authority within the Federal Circuit.64 The Supreme
Court's failure to reverse the court's holding will inevitably re-
sult in uncertainty and unsatisfactory outcomes for future claim-
ants as courts now have the option of following either Cienega
Gardens or Huntleigh IV. While Cienega Gardens demands just
compensation, a court choosing to follow Huntleigh !Vwill inter-
pret nearly any legislation passed by Congress, despite its obvi-
ous intent to directly nullify contract rights and thereby effect a
taking under Cienega Gardens, as merely an incidental frustration
of business expectations.
64 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at 22-25.
,,AS.
